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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the market for human capital created by the 
institution of indentured servitude in colonial America. The indenture system 
allowed English· emigrants to obtain passage to the colonies by selling claims on 
their future labor. With the size of the debt approximately equal for all 
emigrants, the length of the term for which a servant was bound is predicted to 
have varied inversely with expected productivity in the colonies. Analysis of 
two collections of contracts made in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
supports the prediction, Age, skill, and literacy-were negatively related .to 
length of indenture. Women received shorter terms than men at young ages, while 
servants bound for the West Indies and those bound in periods of high colonial 
demand for labor also received reductions, 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the colonial period of American history, two institutions 
existed which provided for the explicit valuation of stocks of human capital 
in the market. One of these was slavery, under which blacks and their 
progeny were held in service for life. The other was indentured servitude, 
under which whites were bound to service for limited periods of time. 
As a result both of its direct importance for the history of the 
nineteenth century and its indirect importance for the history of the 
twentieth, slavery has long been one of the central concerns of American 
social and economic historians. However, in the labor markets of many regions, 
for substantial periods during the first half of the colonial era indentured 
1 servitude was of greater quantitative importance than slavery. In the 
eighteenth century the quantitative significance of indentured servitude 
declined in most of these areas, as slaves were substituted for servants in 
the sugar fields of the West Indies, in the tobacco fields of the Chesapeake 
2 colonies, and in the rice fields of South Carolina. Yet indentured servitude 
nonetheless continued to perform an important role in the colonial labor market 
by providing skilled craftsmen and managers to the large plantations of the 
West Indies and the southern mainland colonies.3 
The essential difference between servitude and slavery was that it 
was the labor of the servant, rather than the person, which was bought and sold. 
Because less attention has been devoted to the study of indentured servitude, 
we are less familiar with the history of the institution. An economic inves-
tigation of its functioning, based on the analysis of quantitative data 
generated by the operation of the market for servants, can therefore serve a 
dual purpose, for it can provide evidence on how capital values were established 
when claims on the labor of humans for long periods were traded in the market, 
while at the same time increasing our understanding of the economic basis of 
white servitude in colonial America, 4 
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II. THE ±NDENTURE BAR GAIN 
Indent ured servitude was a credit system under whi ch h uman labor was 
leased. It f un ctioned thro ugh two markets linked by a re cr uiting agent. In 
England, in the first market, a prospe ctive servant signed a contra ct, or 
"indent ure," with a mer chant, promising to serve the latter or his assigns in 
a parti cular colony for a given period under stated conditions. The servant 
was then transported to the spe cified colonial destination, where the mer chant 
or his representative sold his contract to a colonial planter or farmer in the 
second market. In ret urn for the commitment of his labor, the servant re ceived 
passage to the designated colony, maintenan ce d uring the term of the contra ct, 
and certain freedom d ues at its con cl usion. On ce signed, the indent ure was 
negotiable property, and at any time before its con cl usion the servant could 
be sold to a new master for the balan ce of his term. When the contra ct expired, 
the servant be came free. The conditions of servit ude were reg ulated by colonial 
stat utes as well as by agreements written into the contra cts. The terms of the 
contract were binding upon both master and servant. 
The indent ure system normally operated within a context of competitive 
markets both in England and in the colonies. Servants were one important 
available return-haul cargo for English ships engaged in the trade for colonial 
sugar, toba cco, ri ce and other agri cult ural staples .5 Contemporary fare 
quotations indi cate that the charges for passage from England to Ameri ca were 
uniform at a given time for all individuals and did not vary by spe cifi c colonial 
destination.6 
The planter's demand for indentured servants was based on his 
cal culation of the dis co unted val ue of their net f ut ure earnings, after 
ded ucting the expe cted costs of the servant to him. The present val ue of the 
servant to the planter therefore depended upon the expe cted value of the 
servant's o utp ut in ea ch year of the contract, the expe cted cost of maintenan ce, 
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supervision, and training for the servant d uring ea ch year of the term, the 
dis count rate, and the value of the freedom dues to be paid to the servant. 
These, or analogo us variables, are the same considerations whi ch enter into 
the derivation of a free worker's net age-wealth profile (Be cker [1975), p. 223). 
Yet one criti cal differen ce is that whereas for free workers eviden ce on flows 
is used to cal culate the val ues of capital sto cks, in the case of servants 
these cal culations were performed by planters, who based their demand for 
sto cks of bound labor for fixed terms on their cal culations involving the 
relevant flows. Therefore, like the slave market, the market for indentured 
labor prod uced capital val ues, and the flows underlying these m ust be inferred. 
The instit utional arrangements whi ch provided for the ownership of 
human capital for discrete periods prod uced potential differen ces between the 
patterns of h uman capital values under indent ured servit ude and those impli cit 
in the operation of free labor markets. An advantage of the indent ure system 
to the planter relative to the hiring of free workers was the greater control 
it gave him over the servant's time and effort on ce the bargain was made. 
Be ca use the servant wo uld have been compensated for his loss of freedom, in 
the absen ce of un certainty the pri ce of indentured h uman capital would have 
7 been higher than that of free workers. However in pra cti ce un certainty makes 
the dire ction of the ineq uality between these pri ces unpredi ctable witho ut 
additional information, for it cannot be determined a priori whether the 
ins uran ce value of the contra cts was normally greater to the planter or the 
8 servant. 
All servants who migrated to Ameri ca in curred deb.ts of similar val ue. 
As noted above, passage charges were uniform for all servants, and maintenan ce 
costs and freedom d ues varied little a cross individuals. As a result, every 
servant contra ct was a promise to repay approximately the same sum of money. 
Therefore the present discounted value of every servant's contract should have 
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been approximately the same at the time of binding. Since the productivity 
of servants varied, the conditions of their indentures had to vary. The higher 
the servant's margina l va lue product above his maintenance, the faster he cou ld 
repay the loan made to him, and the shorter the term of the contract. The 
length of indenture across servants shou ld therefore have been negative ly 
corre lated with individual productivity, or equiva lent ly, with the market 
va luation of the current f low of income generated by the individua l's stock of 
human capita l. 
Strictly, if costs had been precise ly the same for a ll servants, 
a ll shou ld have been bound on conditions that wou ld yie ld the same expected 
price on arriva l in the colonies. This of course does not imp ly that no 
variation shou ld have occurred in the rea li zed auction prices of servants in 
the colonies, for random disturbances between the time of binding and auction 
-- such as i l lnesses of servants during the voyage, or changes in the price of 
co lonia l  outputs -- cou ld have produced differences between actual and expected 
prices. What the ana lysis does imp ly, however, is that if the market for 
contracts of servitude was efficient, variation in servants' auction prices 
shou ld have been uncorre lated with a ll the characteristics of the servants 
9 which were known at the time of making the indenture bargain. 
Very litt le evidence of the prices of new ly arrived servants at 
colonia l auctions has survived : from the entire colonia l period the on ly 
known records of auctions of Eng lish servants come from the accounts of two 
ships, the Tristam and Jeane, which sold 68 servants in Virginia in late 
1 63 6  or 1 637, and the Abraham, which so ld 5 6  servants in Barbados in January, 
1 637 (Pub lic Record Office (1 637]). The listings of the amounts paid for the 
servants show that the median and modal prices of both men and women were 
identica l -- 500 lbs. of tobacco -- in both auctions. Thus, a lthough as wi ll 
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of servants' indentures, the avai lable evidence, a lthough limited, suggests 
that neither may have affected the initia l co lonia l auction prices for the 
servants. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the variab le dimensions 
of the contract were adjusted for the servants' characteristics so as to make 
the expected auction prices of a ll servants the same, 
The re lation between auction prices of servants and the simple cost 
of passage is a lso of interest. The moda l price of 500 lbs. of tobacco 
observed in the auctions was 11 percent greater than the fare two free 
passengers each paid for passage to Virginia on the Tristam and Jeane on the 
same voyage as the servants, and 4 percent above the fare quoted e lsewhere for 
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passage from England to Mary land in 1 638. That in these cases the typica l 
auction prices tended to be higher than the fare may have been due to the cost 
of recruiting servants, or to the existence of a premium received by merchants 
for bearing the risk of servant morta lity on the ocean voyage. 
Re lated evidence on the nature of the labor market equi librium in 
the colonies which induced f lows of labor from England is avai lab le from 
surviving va luations of indentured servants recorded in Mary land for probate 
courts. The mean price of 28 ma le servants with four remaining years of 
servitude recorded on Maryland's lower western shore during 1704-57 was £8.95, 
with a median of £9 and a mode of '£10, whi le the mean price of 19 fema les 
with four years remaining was £7.75, with a median of £8 and a mode of f lo.11 
The typica l margina l cost to an Eng lish merchant of de livering servants to 
the co lonies cannot be estimated precisely, but probab ly fe ll within a range 
bounded at the lower end by £5, the usua l cost of passage, and at the upper 
end by the £10 estimated by Abbot Emerson Smith as the maximum expense of 
de livery.
12 
The evidence of the probate va luations, a lthough again limited 
in quantity, suggests that the centra l tendency of the co lonia l price of 
be seen both sex and colonial destination had a significant effect on the length servants did fall within this range, and therefore offers additiona l  support 
6 
for the hypothesis that the price of a servant's indenture in the colonies 
was equal to the marginal cost of delivering labor there from England. 
A number of other general considerations relating to the adjustment 
of the bargain deserve mention. One is the role of mortality. The smaller 
the probability of a servant's serving a given year of his term, the lower 
his expected net earnings and, ceteris paribus, the less favorable the terms 
of the contract he would be able to sign. This is true whether the mortality 
in question is that during the Atlantic crossing, when the merchant bore the 
risk, or that after arrival in the colonies, when the planter had purchased 
13 the contract and assumed the risk. 
A second factor with a similar effect was the possibility of a 
servant failing to serve out his term for a reason other than death, 
principally running away, All the colonies enactecl legislation intended to 
discourage servants from running away; of these some were preventive measures, 
and others punitive. While some colonies p.:ovided for corporal -- and even 
capital -- punishment for runaways, the moat common penalty was extension of 
the servant's contract by some multiple of the time he was absent�4 One of 
the provisions of the contract, the servant's freedom dues, constituted a non-
vested pension and therefore also acted to discourage servants from running 
away. While the form and worth of the dues varied across colonies and over 
time, they were often of substantial value, and could have constituted a 
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the servant's term would be extended, or the servant would be bound over to 
the county for an additional term after the conclusion of his normal term, to 
be sold for the necessary amount. The mother's term was also extended to 
reimburse the master for her lost working time. 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The principal sources of quantitative evidence bearing on this market 
for human capital are servant contracts recorded and held in English courts. 
These were made both to protect servants from kidnapping and to protect merchants 
from false charges of kidnapping. The two largest known surviving collections 
will be analyzed here; the earlier set, recorded in Middlesex during 1683-84, 
covers a total of 812 individuals, while the later, recorded in London during 
1718-58, covers 3,187 servants. 
The principal variable analyzed here will be the length of the 
indenture. Furthermore, this analysis will be done only for the minors in 
both samples; these comprise 22 percent of the servants with known ages in the 
earlier and 67 percent in the later sample. The selection of the variable to 
be analyzed and of the minors follows from consideration of the evidence of 
the contracts. It is clear that four years was the normal duration of an adult's 
indenture in both samples, yet for a combination of legal and clerical reasons 
the full set of conditions of adults' servitude do not appear to have been 
recorded in either set of indentures. For minors, the full conditions do appear 
15 
significant deterrent to servants who considered escaping from their masters. to have been recorded, and the duration of the contract appears to have been 
Servants were not allowed to marry during their terms. Since, by 
English practice, the expense of raising the illegitimate children of servants 
fell on the county, colonial legislation provided that the father should be 
discovered by oath of the mother, and that he should reimburse the county for 
the expense of raising the child until it could be bound out to work. Since 
servants could not normally pay this sum, either the master would pay it and 
the chief variable dimension of the contracts. Both variations in freedom dues 
and restrictions on the servants' occupations in the colonies were rare. Cash 
payments made to adults were not generally recorded in the later sample, but 
the contracts of the minors, on which they do appear to be recorded conscien-
tiously, show that fewer than 6 percent received cash payments. Some cash 
payments are recorded for both minors and adults in the earlier sample, and 
8 
although it is uncertain whether payments were recorded in all cases in which 
they were made, less than 7 percent of the contracts contain such entries. 
A notable feature of the payments recorded in both samples is that virtually 
all -- 95 percent in the earlier, and 97 percent in the later sample -- were 
made to servants bound for four years. Insofar as payments were made (or 
promised) and recorded, analysis of the characteristics of servants who 
received them tends to reinforce the results obtained from the analysis of the 
16 
length of indenture. The evidence of both samples therefore indicates that 
for minors the greatest variation in the conditions of indenture occurred in 
the duration of the term of servitude, while for adults this was not the case, 
as four years was both the standard term for adults and normally the minimum 
17 
term assigned. For adults, cash payments were apparently substituted for 
reductions in the length of servitude below four years. 
Earlier analysis suggested that a servant's term of indenture would 
be inversely related to the market valuation of his stock of human capital. 
This index of the servant's human capital can be related to a number of 
observable characteristics potentially relevant to the determination of the 
present value of that stock. When this is done by multiple regression analysis, 
the estimating equation differs from the common hedonic method only in the use 
of an index for price. The estimated coefficients of the independent variables 
age, sex, literacy, and occupation can be interpreted as the marginal prices 
paid for servants' characteristics in units of the index, while those of 
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destinations represent compensating differentials between regions. 
Table 1 shows a number of the basic relationships underlying the 
market valuation of the servants. In both samples the length of indenture was 
negatively related to both age and skill: with other things equal, servants 
with skilled occupations and those able to sign received shorter terms. Women 
received shorter terms than men, _ceteris paribus, and servants bound for the 
West Indies received shorter terms than those bound for the North American 
mainland. 
9 
A comparison of the estimated coefficients of the sex variable across 
samples indicates that on average women received considerably larger reductions 
in their terms in the 1680s than in the eighteenth century. This decline in 
the premium for females is not surprising in view of the generally declining 
colonial sex ratios during this period, for while women were preferred for 
some kinds of household work and some types of farming, their increasing 
relative availability in most colonies would be expected to lower the size of 
19 
their wage differentials. 
Table 2 provides a more detailed analysis of the length of indenture 
for the later sample, allowing separate age profiles of length of indenture 
by sex and skill. It reveals that there was a tendency for women to receive 
indentures from 5 to 15 percent shorter than those of men through the age of 
17, while for servants aged 18-20 there was no difference in the length of term 
by sex. In a suggestive parallel result, Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman 
found that, excluding the value of child-bearing, the net earnings of female 
slaves were greater than those of men prior to the age of eighteen, apparently 
due to the more rapid physical maturation of women.20 The sex differentials in 
the terms of young indentured servants might have resulted from the same source. 
The results of Table 1 indicate that premia for skills were reflected 
in the length of servants' indentures. The more detailed specification of the 
occupations presented in Table 1 for the London sample indicates that the 
marginal premium paid for servants in each of four occupational categories 
farmers, services, metal and construction crafts, and clothing and textile 
21 trades -- was virtually the same. Unskilled laborers received terms longer 
than servants with skilled occupations, but shorter than those with no recorded 
22 
occupations; the latter result may indica�e that some premium was paid for 
the laborers' work experience, 
10 
TABL E 1 :  E stimated Regression Coefficients, Midd le sex and London Samp le s 
Dependent variab le : number of year s indentured 
Method of e stimation : ordinary lea st square s 
Midd le sex , 1 683-84 London, 1718-59 
Independent Variab le 
Age (year s ) :1 
Le ss than 15 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Sex2 
3 
Literacy 
Date 4 
Trade5 
Farmer 6 
Laborer 
Service s
7 
Meta l and con struction8 
C lothing and texti le s
9 
10 
Antigua 
Barbado s 
Jamaica 
Other We st Indie s11 
Mary land 
Virginia 
O ther main land
12 
Con stant 
R2 
F 
n 
E stimated 
Coefficient 
2. 655
2.201 
1.457 
0.893 
0.174 
0.738 
-1.484 
-0.575 
-0. 727 
-0.227 
-0.553 
-0.398 
-0.401 
0.203 
-0.389 
5.227 
0.555 
12.87 
171 
Standard 
error 
0.385 
0.400 
0.304 
0.367 
0.270 
0.30 6 
0.207 
o. 217 
0.445 
0.812 
0 .274 
0.4 62 
1.094 
0.209 
0. 673 
E stimated 
Coefficient 
2.749 
2.147 
1.304 
o. 728
0.331 
0.1 69 
-0.195 
-0.082 
-0.0060 
-0.313 
-0.14 6 
-0.348 
-0.320 
-0.313 
-0 . .403 
-0.17 6 
-0.233 
-0.479 
0.30 6 
0.127 
0.050 
4. 665 
0.539 
112.82 
2049 
Source : Data u sed are a ll record s of minor s (age le ss than 21 ). 
Standard 
error 
0.134 
0.080 
0.068 
0.062 
0.055 
0.050 
0.073 
0.037 
0.0023 
0.074 
0.079 
0.0 66 
0.0 67 
0.0 60 
0.110 
0.154 
0.060 
0.088 
0.059 
0.073 
0.11 6 
Midd le sex, 1 683-84 : Greater London Record Office; Nicholson (19 65 ); Wareing (197 6). 
London, 1718-59 : Corporation of London Record s Office; Kaminkow and Kaminkow (1964 ); 
Ga len son (1977a ). 
TABLE 1 (Cont'd ) 
Note s :  
1. For age variab le, indicated age 
2. Ma le = 0, fema le = 1. 
3. Marked = 0. signed= 1. 
l; zero c la s s  age 20. 
4. Date entered a s  fina l two digit s of year of regi stration. 
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s. Trade = 0 for laborer s and no recorded occupation s; trade 
men' s occupation s. 
1 for all other 
6. For a ll occupationa l variab le s, indicated occupation ( s )  = l; zero c la ss 
no recorded occupation. "Farmer " inc lude s hu sbandman, ploughman, etc. 
7. Include s accountant, barber, surgeon, etc. 
8. Inc lude s b lack smith, carpenter, cooper, ma son, etc. 
9. Inc ludes c lothier, tai lor, weaver, etc. 
10. For a ll de stination variab les, for Midd le sex samp le, zero c la ss 
for London samp le, zero c la s s  = Penn sylvania 
11. Inc lude s Nevis, St. Chri stopher, etc, 
12. Inc lude s Caro lina, New York, etc. 
ViJ:"ginia; 
TA BLE 2: Est imated Regress ion Coeff ic ients, London Samp le, 1718-59 
Source: See 
Dependent var iab le: number of years indentured 
Method of est imat ion: ord inary least squares 
Est imated Standard 
Independent Var iab le Coeff ic ient error 
Age (years): 
Less than 15 2.976 0.144 
15 2.378 0.092 
1 6  1.542 0.084 
17 0.959 0.084 
18 0.473 0.079 
19 1 0.2 60 0.083 Women, age: 
Less than 15 -1.034 0.460 
15 -0.472 0.390 
1 6  -0.969 0.228 
17 -0.302 0.1 61 
18 0.041 0.159 
19 0.090 0.135 
20 2 0.198 0.156 Trade, age: 
15 -1.49 6 o. 392 
1 6  -0.884 0.20 6 
17 -0.502 0.117 
18 -0.275 0.085 
19 -0.224 0.073 
20 -0.103 0.07 6 
Literacy -0.07 6 0.036 
Date 3 -0.0093 0.0024 Ant igua -0.260 0,235 
Barbados -0.005 0.2 68 
Jama ica -0.084 0.209 
Other West Ind ies -0.3 63 0.221 
Mary land 0.194 0.0 63 
Other ma in land -0.039 0.072 
February 4 -0.100 0.092 
March 0.171 0.113 
Apr il 0.15 6 0.119 
May -0.095 0.164 
June -0.431 0.132 
Ju ly -0.196 0.113 
August -0.486 0.098 
September -0.223 0.09 6 
October -0.400 0.101 
November -0.225 0.100 
December 0.014 0.097 
Sugar 6 -0.01 62 0.0074 
c2nstant 4.830 
R 0.5 66 
F 52.0 6 
n 2044 
Tab le 1, London, 1718-59. 
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TA B LE 2 (Cont'd ) 
Notes: 
1. Female - age interact ions: ind icated var iab le = 1 for women of g iven age. 
2. Trade - age interact ions: ind icated variab le = 1 for men of g iven age who 
recorded a trade (as def ined in Tab le 1). 
3. For dest inat ions, zero c lass = V irgin ia 
4. For months, zero c lass = January. Separate interact ion terms between West 
Ind ian dest inat ion and month of reg istrat ion were inc luded in the equat ion, 
but the ir coeff ic ients were generally sma ll in va lue, and are not reported. 
5. Sugar = Average annua l pr ice of muscovado sugar in London, in s h illings per 
hundredwe ight, lagged one year, for servants bound for West Ind ies. Source: 
Sher idan (1974), pp. 49 6-97, w ith linear interpo lat ion for 1717-20 and 1727. 
A ll other var iab les def ined in Table 1. 
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Economists have devoted considerable attention to the analysis of 
the relationship between productivity and age, and have accumulated much 
evidence on the association between age and wages in recent periods. Less is 
known of the nature of this relation in past times. It is therefore of some 
interest to consider in more detail the implications of the estimated relation-
ships between age and length of indenture for the age-earnings profiles of 
23 servants. Table 3 presents estimates of the relative annual net earnings 
of servants by age for unskilled and skilled men. The calculations are based 
on the assumption that the expected colonial sale price of each individual' s 
contract was equal to the constant marginal cost of delivering servants to the 
colonies. 24 The relationship between age and net earnings is assumed to have 
been linear, making average net productivity during the term equal to net 
productivity at the term' s midpoint. The estimates of average net productivity 
are derived from the following formulation of the mean present value of the 
contracts of servants of age j at the beginning of the term: 
� NP - w PVj l i i=l (1 + r) 
where NP expected mean annual net productivity during the term; 
n = mean length of term for servants in each entering age group; 
w mean annual wage payments made to servants during the term; 
r = discount rate. 
To solve for the value of NP for each entering cohort, the mean present value 
of the contracts was set equal to '£10, an estimate of the marginal cost of 
delivering servants to the colonies. The mean age of each group at the time 
of binding was taken as the recorded age plus one half year to allow for the 
rounding of age upon registration. The mean length of term by age was derived 
from the coefficients of Table 2, while the mean annual wage payments were 
25 taken directly from the indenture contracts. The estimates were made with 
a discount rate of 10 percent. 
Age 
19. l 
19. 7 
20. 4 
21. 2 
22. 0 
22. 9 
15 
TABLE 3: Estimated Relative Net Annual Earnings of Servants
 by Age 
Unskilled Skilled 
Relative Mean Relative Mean 
iiet annual net earnings net annual 
net earnings 
earnings (age 22. 9=1. 00) Age earnings 
(age 22. 9=1. 00) 
. 742 18. 4 £ 2. 39 
. 413 
£ 2. 01 
. 812 19. 2 2,,86 
. 495 
2. 20
. 871 20. 1 3. 32 
. 574 
2. 36 
. 930 21. 0 4 . 08 
. 706 
2. 52 
2. 60 . 959 21. 9 4. 22 
. 730 
2. 7 1 1. 000 22. 9 5. 78 
1. 000 
The 
s r e• Calculated from Table 2 and footnote 24. See text for proc
edure. 
u��k�lied profile is calculated from the basic age profile of Tabl(� 2, dt�)t of 
the skilled from the basic age profile combined with 
the skilled tra e 
coefficients. 
1 6  
The est imates of Tab le 3, wh ich ind icate that the net earn ings prof ile 
of sk illed servants was steeper than that of the unsk illed, are cons istent 
w ith the norma l pos it ive re lat ionsh ip between the steepness of age -earn ings 
prof iles and train ing. The ages at wh ich the servants cons idered here were 
bound, between 15 and 20, were pr ime ones for tra in ing in a w ide var iety of 
sk illed crafts in pre - industr ia l Eng land, through e ither apprent icesh ip or less 
forma l arrangements. It is therefore not surpr is ing that the net produ ct iv ity 
of those in sk illed trades rose rap idly dur ing th is period of the life cy cle , 
Sk illed servants rece ived a cons iderable prem ium : even at age 15, 
a sk illed servant re ce ived a term 21 per cent shorter than h is unsk illed counter -
part. The e xistence of a s izeable prem ium at su ch an ear ly age cou ld have 
been due in part to d ifferen ces in the re lat ive average work exper ien ce of the 
sk illed and unsk illed. Thus possess ion of a sk illed trade at any age imp lied 
prior work exper ien ce. The age of entry into the labor for ce for those men 
reg istered w ithout o ccupat ions cannot be determ ined, but it is poss ib le that 
the typ ical age of entry for the unsk illed into emp loyment was that at wh ich 
Eng lish boys norma lly left home to live in serv ice, roughly 15. If th is were 
the case, work e xper ien ce and a cqu ired on -the -job tra in ing might have accO"unted 
for a s ign if icant port ion of the prem ium for sk illed workers. Th is wou ld 
part icu larly be true for the younger servants, as the re lat ive leve l of work 
exper ien ce of a sk illed to an unskilled worker wou ld be greatest at the lower 
ages observed here, and wou ld decline w ith age thereafter. That the rat io of 
sk illed to unsk illed net earn ings in creased w ith age wou ld appear to be strong 
ev iden ce of the presen ce of forma l tra in ing for those in the skilled group. 
An interest ing feature of the re lat ive age -net earn ings prof ile of 
the unsk illed shown in T.ab le 3 is its close resemb lan ce to those obta ined by 
Foge l and Engerman for unsk illed m.ale s laves in the southern Un:lted States dur ing 
1790-18 60 ( [1972] Charts III and I V ). In view of the cons iderab le d ifferen ces 
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between these samples w ith respe ct to such var iab les as locat ion and crops 
cu lt ivated, the s im ilar ity of the shapes of the prof iles m ight suggest the 
importan ce of phys iolog ica l  fa ctors, part icu lar ly the rate of phys ica l maturat ior 
in determ in ing the change in the produ ct iv ity of unsk illed workers w ith age 
under cond it ions of p lantat ion agr icu lture in the e ighteenth and n ineteenth 
centur ies. 
The re lat ive ly small prem ium pa id for the ab ility to s ign in the 
later sample may have been due both to the abundan ce of literate servants and 
to h igh literacy rates in the colon ies. The de cline in the s ize of the reduc­
t ion of the term due to the ab ility to sign between the dates of the two samples 
may have resu lted in part from a cons iderab le in crease in l iteracy among the 
servants, as only 35 per cent s igned in the ear lier sample compared to 67 percent 
in the later one.
2 6  
In both samples, w ith other chara cter ist ics constant, servants bound 
for the West Ind ies tended to re ce ive shorter terms than those bound for ma in ­
land colon ies. That servants who em igrated to the West Ind ies rece ived shorter 
terms to compensate them for the ir cho ice is cons istent w ith the fa ct that 
wh ile both work ing cond it ions for servants and e conomic opportun it ies for 
freedmen were known to be poor in the islands after the introduct ion of large­
s ca le sugar cu lt ivat ion in the se cond ha lf of the seventeenth century, w ith 
its attendant s lave gangs and conso lidat ion of small farms into large estates, 
the ma in land long cont inued to be considered a land of opportun ity for poor 
imm igrants, where freed servants cou ld hope to own land and be come prosperous 
members of so ciety. A pers istent theme of West Ind ian compla ints appeared in 
a 1 675 pet it ion sent to the K ing of Eng land by the Coun cil and Assembly of 
Barbados : "In former tyrnes Wee were p lent ifully furn ished w ith Chr ist ian 
[ i.e., wh ite] servants from Eng land . . . but now Wee can gett few Eng lish, 
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having noe Lands to give them at the end of their tyme, which formerly was 
their main a llurement. " The higher morta lity rates of the West Indian co lonies 
decreased their servants' expected productivity and made servants re luctant to 
go to the region, but in conjunction with the high productivity of labor in 
sugar production acted to raise the demand for new f lows of rep lacement immigrant 
labor. That servants bound for the West Indies received terms shorter than 
those bound for the main land in spite of the higher morta lity rates in the 
is lands implies that the margina l productivity of labor was higher in the West 
Indies than in the main land co lonies.27 
Both the lower intercept estimated for the later samp le and the 
estimated negative time trend of the later sample indicate a secular dec line 
in the length of indenture. The direction of change is consistent with a 
number of long -term trends, inc luding rising reservation wages of servants due 
to rising rea l wages in Eng land between the mid-1 680s and the midd le of the 
eighteenth century, fa lling rea l shipping costs, and dec lining co lonial 
morta lity rates which cou ld have produced a secu lar increase in the co lonial 
demand for labor.28 The negative estimated trend further suggests the 
presence of a secu lar increase in rea l wages in the co lonies during the period 
spanned by these two samp les. 
A consistent seasona l pattern in the length of indenture appears in 
the resu lts of Tab le 2, as servants bound for main land destinations whose 
indentures were signed between June and November received sizeab le reductions 
in their terms re lative to servants bound in winter and spring. Most of these 
servants were bound for Mary land or Virginia, and the observed pattern cou ld 
have been due to the effect of the seasonality of tobacco production on the 
costs invo lved in supp lying servant labor to the Chesapeake. The shipping 
patterns resulting from the timing of the harvests dictated that the amount 
of backhau l space for servants was greatest in summer and ear ly fa ll. Since 
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servants were provided with food and lodging from the time they signed their 
contracts, the cost of de livering a servant to the co lonies may have dec lined 
in peak shipping seasons because the more frequent departures of ships reduced 
the average waiting time in port between binding and sai ling. The lower costs 
of the peak seasons cou ld therefore have resu lted in shorter indentures for 
b d i k h f h b d i 1 k h. . h 29 servants oun n pea seasons t an or t ose oun n s ac s 1pp1ng mont s. 
Another potentia l source of variation in the length of indenture 
was annua l changes in the co lonia l demand for labor. The resu lts presented 
in Tab le 2 indicate that the lagged annua l average price of muscovado sugar 
in London had a significant and negative effect on the length of indentures 
of servants bound for the West Indies during 1718 -59; the estimated effect of 
a change of the price of sugar from its minimum to its maximum in the period 
with other things equa l was a reduction of about five months in the term of 
indenture. The sign of this effect wou ld be the one predicted if, as appears 
to have been the case, high sugar prices normal ly resu lted from high levels 
of demand for sugar rather than reductions in supply, for high sugar prices 
would then have tended to produce high demand for labor, and ceteris paribus, 
to shorten terms.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The price paid for human capita l in the colonia l American market 
for indentured servants varied systematica lly with respect to factors which 
inf luenced their productivity, as economic theory predicts. All servants 
incurred debts of simi lar va lue in emigrating to the colonies, and so ld c laims 
on their future labor, in the form of indentures, to repay these debts. 
Characteristics which raised the expected productivity of servants in the 
American colonies raised the market va luation of their human capita l, and 
therefore shortened the term for which the servant was bound. Thus servants 
with ski lled trades and those ab le to sign served shorter terms than the 
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unski lled and i lliterate of simi lar age and sex. Women were found to have 
received shorter terms than men until the age of 18, perhaps due to their 
ear lier maturation. The results a lso indicated that servants bound for the 
West Indies received shorter terms in compensation for their undesirable 
destinations. Servants bound during peak shipping seasons were found to have 
received reduced terms, perhaps due to the shorter average waiting time prior 
to departure in those months when return -hau l cargo space was most abundant. 
Final ly, the length of indenture of servants bound for the West Indies was 
found to have varied inverse ly with the price of sugar, suggesting that 
increases in the co loni a l  demand for labor shortened the term of servitude. 
Among the issues which need further investigation are the precise 
reasons for the observed shapes of the age -earnings profi les of servants. 
Additional research, inc luding the collection of evidence on wage rates in the 
co lonies by age and ski l l, may serve to distinguish and iso late the effects 
of such contributory factors as physical maturation and investment in human 
capita l in producing the age -earnings re lationships which lay behind the market 
va luation of indentured human capita l. What the present research has indicated 
is that the app lication of economic ana lysis to quantitative evidence generated 
by the system of indentured servitude can provide information on the way in 
which the market once e xp licitly eva luated stocks of human capita l, and in so 
doing can yie ld new insights into the operation of labor markets in ear ly 
America, 
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I am gratefu l to Stanley Engerman for discussions of many of the issues treated 
in this paper and comments on an ear lier draft. I would a lso like to thank 
Andrew Abe l, Gary Becker, Lance Davis, Robert Foge l, Richard Freeman, Russe ll 
Menard, Frederic Mishkin, Sherwin Rosen, T. W. Schultz, George Stigler and 
participants in seminars at Co lumbia University, the University of Chicago, 
the University of I llinois, the Newberry Library, the University of Southampton, 
and the 1980 C liometrics Conference for their suggestions and comments, 
1. An examp le is Mary land, where a study of probate inventories has indicated 
that as late as 1 674 -79 the ratio of servants to s laves held in estates was 
3.88; Menard (1977b ), p. 3 60. It shou ld be pointed out that in some areas 
neither type of bound labor was quantitative ly important. S laves never accounted 
for more than 3 percent of New Eng land's tota l popu lation in the colonial period, 
and the share of servants was probably of a simi lar magnitude ; Greene (1942 ), 
Chap, 3 ;  Smith (1947 ), pp. 28-29. A generalization that he ld for a number of 
major co lonia l regions is that the share of bound workers in a region's labor 
force tended to rise as one trave lled south from New England, with progressive ly 
increasing shares in the midd le co lonies, the Chesapeake, South Carolina, and 
the West Indies. For evidence on popu lation composition, see Greene and 
Harrington (1932 ) ;  Suther land (193 6 ) ; Wells (1975 ). 
2. For accounts of this process in the West Indies, see Dunn (1973 ); for the 
Chesapeake, see Menard (1977b ) ;  for South Caro lina, see Wood (1975 ). 
3. On this change, see Gray (1958), I, p. 350 ; Pares (19 60 ), p. 19 ; for
additiona l evidence see Ga lenson (1979a ), Chapter 10. 
4. The present paper extends the analysis and empirica l  findings of Ga lenson 
(1977b ). 
5. Bruce (1907 ), I, p. 622 ; Smith (1947 ), p ,  39 ; �!iddleton (1953 ), pp. 145-5 6. 
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6, Wh ile £6 was the fare c ited in the early colon ial per iod, after the m iddle 
of the seventeenth century £5 was the fare normally quoted for passage to all 
colon ies. For references to quotat ions of passage charges from England to a 
number of colon ies, see e.g., K ingsbury (190 6), I, pp. 277 -78; Sm ith (1624), 
p. 162; Purchas (1 625), I V, p. 1791; Helyar (1 670), Jan. 4, 1 670; Jeaffreson 
(1878), II, p. 102; Bullock (1 649), p. 47; W ilson (1 682), p. 19; Littleton 
(1689), p. 17; Alexander (1972), p. 45; Sm ith (1947), p. 35. A qual if icat ion 
to the statement in the text is poss ible seasonal var iat ion in the cost of 
del iver ing servants to some colon ies, d iscussed below. 
7. Th is assumes a solut ion to the problem of mon itor ing the servant's work in 
wh ich the product iv ity ga ins from the master's control over the servant's t ime 
and effort were not offset by sh irk ing. 
8. In a world in wh ich futures contracts for free wage labor could be made w ith 
certa in fulf illment, the present value of an indenture for a g iven number of 
years and of a ser ies of contracts for h ires for the same years would d iffer 
only by a prem ium wh ich would re imburse the servant for the loss of freedom 
result ing from h is res idence in the master's household and due to other legal 
prov is ions governing serv itude. However in the absence of these guaranteed 
futures contracts, in some cases the master m ight also have been w ill ing to pay 
more for an indenture because of the assurance it gave h im of labor supply in 
peak seasons, or future years; s im ilarly, workers m ight somet imes have been 
� illing to accept lower impl ic it wages in return for the guarantee of employ ­
ment the indenture represented. The relat ive cost of th is insurance to master 
and servant could vary, and as a result the relat ion between the impl ic it wage 
pa id to servants and the h ire rate for free workers is indeterm inate. 
9. Th is statement neglects one potent ial element of cost. The marg inal cost 
of del ivery, and therefore au�t ion pr ices, would have included any costs the 
merchant incurred in recru it ing servants in England. These could clearly vary 
across ind iv idual servants, produc ing d ifferences in expected auct ion pr ices, 
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These costs could have been correlated w ith ind iv idual product iv ity, as in some 
instances sk illed servants were g iven lump sum payments at the t ime of b ind ing , 
For some ev idence of th is pract ice, see the analys is of the M iddlesex sample 
in the append ix. 
10. The two free passengers each pa id 450 lbs. of tobacco; Publ ic Record Off ice 
(1 637). For the 1 637 Chesapeake farm pr ice of tobacco, See Menard (1975), 
p. 475. The fare quotat ion, of £ 6  sterl ing per person, is in Maryland H istor ical 
Soc iety (1889), p. 206. 
11. I am grateful to the St. Mary's C ity Comm iss ion, Annapol is, Maryland, for 
transcr ipt ions of the probate pr ice quotat ions. Most of the quotat ions are 
from the early decades of the per iod; on devaluat ion of Maryland currency and 
its reflect ion in probate valuat ions, see McCusker (1978), pp. 189-204, and 
Ma in (1972), pp. 14-18. 
12. Sm ith (1947), p. 37. A prec ise analys is would include a pos it ive prem ium
in the probate valuat ions, for these servants had normally been "seasoned ", 
i.e., had spent a year in the new colon ial d isease env ironment, and 
consequently had a longer l ife expectancy than the new arrivals, ceter is par ibus. 
13. Mortal ity rates d iffered between colon ies, and the effects of th is on the 
length of indenture w ill be d iscussed below. The assumpt ion here w ill be that 
mortal ity rates among servants both dur ing passage and in the colon ies were not 
systemat ically related to ind iv idual product iv ity. 
14. For references to laws relat ing to runaways, Sm ith (1947), pp. 2 64-70; 
Semmes (1938), pp. 116-18. The strong terms of th is colon ial leg islat ion were 
an important element in the indenture system's success, and some authors have 
argued that changes in the legal prov is ions for the enforcement of contracts 
were central to its decl ine in the early n ineteenth century: e.g., Ge iser 
(1901), p. 42. S im ilarly, the lack of success of th e attempt to rev ive a contract 
labor system dur ing 18 64-85 has been attr ibuted in part to the h igh cost of 
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enforcing contracts through civi l  action ; Erickson (1957), pp. 4 6-48. 
15. On freedom dues, see Smith (1947), pp. 348-51 ; Heavner (197 6), pp. 50-51. 
For a discussion of an ana logous provision, non-vested pensions as a firm's 
insurance against quits, see Becker (1975), p. 34. 
The nature of freedom dues has some imp lications for other dimensions of 
the servant contract. The dues were specified by co lonia l law, and were 
equa l for a ll servants in a given co lony. Therefore the discounted cost of 
the dues to the p lanter at the time he purchased a contract varied inverse ly 
with the length of the contract. One effect of the fixed nomina l va lue of 
the freedom dues may therefore have been to tend to reduce the amount of 
variation ln the lengLh and other dimensions of the contracts, since the 
variations in the latter were intended to equa lize the net present va lues of 
a l l  contracts. This point shou ld not obscure another basic effect of the 
existence of freedom dues, for ceteris paribus they raised the cost of 
servants, and therefore tended to lengthen the term of indenture. 
1 6. See the appendix , 
17. Terms of less than four years do occur, but they appear to have been rare 
after the mid-seventeenth century ; thus they account for on ly 0.5 percent of 
a l l  indentures of known length in the Midd lesex registrations of 1 683-84, and 
1.2 percent of those in the London registrations of 1718 -59. The reasons for 
this are not known. Four years may have been the term required at most times 
and p laces for the average adu lt to repay the cost of passage out of his net 
earnings, but it is unc lear why shorter terms were not more often given to 
highly ski l led servants like the accountant James Corss, whom Wa lter Tu llidepl 
sent to the manager of his plantation in Antigua in 1759 with a note stating 
that he "hath bound himse lf to serve me four years agreeab le to the Laws of 
Ant.igua, but as he is 22 years of Age, he thought it hard to serve so long anc 
for that reason, I have given him a Certificate that he is to be abso lved fron 
the last year's Service " ;  Tu llideph (1759), Vol. III. That p lanters preferrec 
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to substitute sa laries for reductions of the term below four years suggests 
the possibi lity that fixed costs of hiring and/or a desire to capture the 
returns from a servant's genera l training in the co lony may have been important 
considerations. 
18. On the interpretation of coefficients in hedonic price indexes, see Rosen 
(1975), pp. 34-35. 
19. The difference between samp les in the sex coefficients in Tab le 1 is
significant at the . 01 leve l. On dec lining co lonia l sex ratios, see We lls 
(1975), pp. 15 6, 219,244. 
20. Foge l and Engerman (1974), p. 77 ; a lso Metzer (1975), pp. 13 6-37. 
21. None of the four coefficients is significant ly different from any of the 
other three at the .10 leve l ,  On the va lue of skilled servants in the co lonies, 
see, e.g., Jeaffreson (1878), I, p. 18 6 ;  Martin (17 61), IV, f. 97v ;  Galenson 
(1979a), pp. 314-19. 
22. The coefficient of laborer for the London sample in Tab le 1 is significant ly 
different from that of farmer at the .10 leve l for a one-tai led t-test, from 
those of meta l-construction and c lothing -texti les at .OS, and from that of 
services at .025. 
23. It might be noted that the erratic behavior of the coefficients of higher 
ages in Tab le 1 for the Midd lesex samp le may have been due to the fa lsification 
of the ages of some servants. This may have resu lted from the lega l require ­
ments under which the registrations were made ; for discussion and e vidence see 
Ga lenson (1979a), Appendix to Chapter 3. 
24. Possible seasona l variation in de livery costs has been contro lled for in
the equation reported in Tab le 2. 
25. No wages were recorded for unski l led servants. The a verage wage payments 
received by the ski lled servants in the London samp le by age were as follows : 
AGE 
15 
1 6  
17 
18 
19 
20 
MEAN ANN U A L  WAGE 
£0 
0.40 
o. 79 
1.45 
1.52 
3.02 
2 6  
2 6. On the re lationship between ability to sign and other aspects of literacy 
in this period, see Schofie ld (19 68), pp. 311-25. The difference between the 
coefficients of literacy in the two samples is significant at .10 for a two -
tai led t-test. On the servants' abi lity to sign, see Galenson (1979b). 
27. Public Record Office (1 675). On re lative morta lity rates in the West
Indian and main land co lonies, see We lls (1975), pp. 280-82. That West Indian 
p lanters continued to produce in spite of the higher labor costs they faced 
implies that their demand schedu les for labor were above those of main land 
p lanters. 
28. On Eng lish wages, see Gi lboy (1934), pp. 219-25; Phelps Brown and Hopkins 
(195 6), pp. 302 -13. On changes in colonia l morta lity rates see, e.g., Menard 
(1977a), pp. 99-100. 
The organization and quality of information in the market for contracts 
may have improved during the period spanned by the two samples. It is suggestive 
that the coefficient of variation of the term of indenture among men of a given 
age was considerab ly lower in the later than the ear lier sample for six of the 
eight age groups of minors above the age of twelve. On the relation of wage 
dispersion to information, see Stigler (19 62). 
29. On the seasona lity of tobacco production and shipping, see Bruce (1907), 
Vo l. I, pp. 622-24; Bu l lock (1649), p. 4 6; A lsop (1666), p. 51. On the costs of 
maintaining servants between binding and sailing, see Smith (1947) pp. 3 6-37, 
59- 65; Scottish Record Office, GD23 /6/98, nos. 4, 14, 18. For factors 
relevant to �easona lity in the colonia l demand for labor, see Mu llin (1972), 
p. 15, and Morgan (1975), p. 158. 
30 , Similar ana lysis of the contracts of servants bound for the Chesapeake 
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during 1718 -40 indicates that the lagged annua l farm price of Maryland tobacco 
had no significant effect on the length of indenture; in a regression equation 
which included the variab les of Tab le 2, the estimated coefficient of an inter-
action term between the price of tobacco, lagged one year, and Chesapeake 
destination was insignificant. Due to a greater continuing re liance on produc-
tion of a sing le staple in the West Indies in the eighteenth century, the price 
of sugar may serve as a better index of the West Indian demand for labor than 
does the price of tobacco for the Chesapeake. On diversification of agricu l� 
tura l production in the Chesapeake, see C lemens, (1974), pp. 100-48; Stiverson 
(1977), pp. 65-103. 
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A P PENDIX 
For the Midd lesex samp le of 1683-84 a regression equation was estimated 
with the amount of the cash payment (in shi llings, ster ling) made to a servant 
as the dependent variab le, with the same independent variab les used in the 
ana lysis of the length of indenture. The samp le used was that of a l l  servants, 
minors and adu lts, whose contracts contained a l l  the necessary information . 
The resu lts are as fo llows : 
IndeEendent variab le Estimated coefficent 
Notes : 
1. Male 
Age (years) 0.011 
Sex 1 -0.485 
Literacy 2 -0.443 
Trade3 1.466 
West Indies 
4 0.088 
Constant 0.323 
R2 0.026 
F 4.03 
n 760 
Source: See Table 1, Midd lesex, 1683-84. 
O, female = 1. 
2. Marked = 0, signed = 1. 
3. Laborer or no occupation O; a ll other occupations 
4. West Indian destinations l ;  main land = 0. 
1. 
Standard error 
0.038 
0.456 
0.363 
0.399 
0.354 
The hypothesis that a ll the coefficients are simu ltaneous ly equa l to 
zero can be rejected at the .01 level, but the proportion of the variance 
exp lained is sma ll, as might be expected in view of the rarity of the payments. 
On ly one coefficient is significant at the .01 leve l :  possession of a ski lled 
trade, which Tab le 1 shows to have reduced the term of an indenture, significantly 
raised the expected cash payment made to a servant. 
As noted in the text, cash payments appear to have been recorded 
on ly for minors in the London sample of 1718-59. The form of the payments 
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recorded differs from that of the ear lier sample : whereas the cash payments 
to servants in the Midd lesex contracts of 1683-84 appear to have been simple 
lump sum payments made at the time of binding, those contracted for in London 
in the eighteenth century samp le were general ly sa laries, to be paid annua lly 
in loca l currency. A regression was estimated with the amount of the annua l 
sa lary (in pounds loca l currency) as the dependent variab le, with the same 
independent variab les used above. (The dependent variab le is the unad justed 
va lue of the co lonia l currency. A lthough most of the colonies' currencies 
were devalued relative to ster ling, the differences in currency va lues across 
the principa l American co lonies in most of this period were small. See Mc cusker 
[1978]). The samp le used was that of a ll minors (age less than 21) whose 
contracts contained a ll the necessary information. The resu lts were as fo llows : 
IndeEendent variab le Estimated coefficient Standard error 
Age 0.144 0.054 
Sex 0.306 0.329 
Literacy 0.428 0.167 
Trade 1. 397 0.190 
West Indies 1. 291 0.165 
Constant -3.141 
R
2 0.094 
F 42.20 
n 2046 
Source : See Tab le 1, London, 1718-59. 
Notes : A ll variab les defined as in ear lier tab le, this appendix. 
30 
The relationship is again statistically significant, and the proportion 
of the variance explained is again low. Age, literacy, possession of a skilled 
trade, and West Indian destinations are all significant at .01 and positively 
related to the servant's salary; in Table 2 it is shown that all are signifi-
cantly and negatively associated with the length of indenture. 
The results of the analysis of servants' cash payments and salaries 
in both samples are consistent with the hypothesis that these were positively 
related to the servants' expected earnings in the colonies. These results 
therefore reinforce the analysis presented of the length of indenture. 
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